Each week, I try to let readers know just a bit about the person I’m reviewing. Last week, I introduced St. Thomas Aquinas to readers. Thomas was born in 1225 at Roccasecca, midway between Rome and Naples. [1] At the age of five, he was entered at the monastery at Montecassino where his studies began. When the monastery became a battle site (as it was in the Second World War), Thomas was sent by his family to the University of Naples. There that he came into contact with Christian interpretations of Aristotle and the Order of Preachers or Dominicans. Aquinas became a Dominican over the protests of his family and eventually went into Northern Europe to study, in t Paris and at Cologne with Albert the Great. Returned to Paris, he completed his studies, became a Master and for three years occupied one of the Dominican chairs in the Faculty of Theology. He spent the next decade in Italy.

Physically, Aquinas was a large man quiet and soft-spoken man, earning him the nickname “the Dumb Ox” by his classmates. The “dumb” part was clearly foolish, as he is one of the most brilliant philosophers and theologians of human history.  In 1274, on his way to the Council of Lyon, he fell ill and died on March 7 in the Cistercian abbey at Fossanova, near Roccasecca where he was born. Before Thomas died, he had a vision, which caused him to remark, “I can write no more. I have seen things which make all my writings like straw.”

Natural Law

Last week, we focused our attention on Aquinas’ notion of “natural law.” The idea of “natural law” is difficult for modern people to grasp. The reason for this is the difference in the way people see reality in the contemporary West and the way in which Thomas would have seen the world. Modern people think of two kinds of laws, mathematical laws, which are deductively certain and scientific laws, which are verified by scientific inquiry. Mathematical laws are certain because they are a matter of mathematical logic. Scientific laws are certain in a different way, they are certain as verified by experiment until disconfirming evidence is discovered, as it sometimes is. To the modern mind, the word “natural” implies “physical and susceptible to scientific analysis. Neither modern idea of certainty involves the kind of reason applicable in natural law theory. Natural law theory is a matter of practical reason.

Practical Wisdom and Government

In order to understand the notion of natural law, it helps to understand a distinction Aquinas makes between theoretical and practical reason. Theoretical reason proceeds from given hypotheses and reaches necessary conclusions. An example of this would be mathematical systems. Practical reason, on the other hand reasons from general principles, but deals with contingent things, like the probable result of some human action (ST I-II, Q 94).

As human reason considers precepts of natural law, it develops the habit of possessing them, so that natural law becomes a matter of character (ST I-II, Q 94, First Article). Thus, natural law is primarily a matter of rule of reason resulting in a habit of action developed by the exercise of practical reason (ST I-II, Q 94, Second Article).

This means that the truth that obtains from practical reason is of a different type altogether from the truth deduced in the process of theoretical or scientific reason. According to Aquinas, in the case of practical reason, its general principles are true for all people, but the conclusions are not. Thus, the certainty of natural law is never the same kind of certainty one has for mathematical or scientific law. The question for practical reason is, “Does this rule of action lead to the attainment of the objective that reason dictates in this situation?”

To make this a bit clearer, let us take a principle like, “It can be dangerous to borrow money.” It is a well-known fact of human existence that people who borrow too much can get into a lot of trouble. In every case, human experience shows that one who borrows money must abide by certain limitations on his or her actions set by the lender. These may be reasonable and achievable or otherwise depending upon he circumstances. It is also true that economic circumstances may change and an inability pay and even bankruptcy may result. On the other hand, in many circumstances, including to build a business or buy a home, it may be necessary to borrow money. The principle is true for all people, but the conclusions differ from person to person.

Government as a Matter of Practical Reason

Government is a practical, not a theoretical enterprise, which is why it should be conducted by persons of significant practical wisdom and experience.  The evolution, design, and conduct of government and law is not, for Aquinas, a theoretical matter. It is practical and requires skill gained by the practical exercise of wisdom. Those that govern must have sufficient practical wisdom that they can apply principles of practical reason to differing circumstances and achieve a just result for the society that they are governing.

The necessity for practical wisdom and experience flows from Aquinas’ observation that truth as to matters of practical reason is only true for human beings as to general principles (like “borrowing money is dangerous”) not as regards particular conclusions (“Our government needs to borrow money to offset the impact of Covid19”). This means that the conclusions of practical reason (unlike mathematics) will always be provisional and subject to change (ST I-II, Q 94, Fourth Article). This is very important for all governments, but perhaps especially important to understand for democratic republics like the United States of America. Without leadership with proven practical wisdom, important and damaging mistakes are bound to be made.

As to practical reason Aquinas concludes “… the truth or rectitude regarding particular conclusions of practical reason is neither the same for all persons or known in equal measure even by those for which it is the same” (ST I-II, Q 94, Fourth Article). The more complex the issue, and the more factors which practical reason must include in its pondering, the more exceptions and differences of opinion that will emerge to any inquirer (ST I-II, Q 94, Fourth Article).

In the case of a wise and well led polity, rules seek the good for the people and avoid laws and policies that are unwise or unjust. They seek the good of the entire society of which they have been made leaders. The laws of the society are not directed towards the good of a single individual (as in tyranny), or a few (as in an oligarchy), or the majority (as in a decadent democracy), but towards ideals of the public good and social peace and good order. That is to say, in a well led polity, the leaders direct their government according to wise precepts of natural law.

The Problem of Unjust Rule

As mentioned above, kings may become tyrants, democratic societies mobs, an elite and oligarchy. If a those in charge of a society make unjust laws, that is laws consistently contrary to nature, they have led their society outside of the boundaries of law and of order towards a common good. For Aquinas, whatever the form of government, the making of unnatural or unjust laws creates a form of tyranny. Tyranny is an unjust form of government, and its laws are not really laws at all (ST I-II, Q 95).

At this point, Aquinas takes a position that would have been nearly unknown and even revolutionary in the Middle Ages, and which anticipates modern developments: In the case of an unjust, tyrannical government, the subjects of such tyranny can, under some circumstances revolt and change their government. Aquinas was not inclined to justify rebellion just because a people felt one or a few proclamations of a lawful authority to be wrong.

As a general matter, however, the subjects of a lawful power owe to their government a duty of loyalty and obedience (ST I-II, Q 104). Thus, “…the order of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, since stability in human affairs could not be otherwise maintained….”) (ST I-II, Q 104, 183). However, while human beings are morally obligated to obey God in all things, the same is not true of human rulers (ST I-II, Q 104). “Human beings are obligated to obey secular rulers insofar as the order of justice requires. And so, if secular rulers have usurped power, and therefore have no just authority, or if secular rules command unjust things, subjects are not obligated to obey them, except perhaps incidentally in order to avoid scandal or danger.” (ST I-II, Q 104, 183). Thus, an unjust, tyrannical government may be replaced.

The Role of Morality and Virtue in Government

For Aquinas, it is possible to divide the virtues into three main categories: intellectual, moral, and theological. One can easily see that the focus of character development for leaders is upon the second category, which virtues can only be developed by the exercise of practical wisdom. A wise government is oriented towards the achievement of justice and social harmony and has the wisdom and ability to achieve it.

The very use of works like “just” imply that for a government to avoid evil and destructive actions, those that govern must have a set of habits (virtues) that enable them to decide and act wisely. It is not likely that a leader can act justly in the common good without the virtue of Justice. As a result, Aquinas deals with this virtue in his Summa Theologica.

Because of the importance of virtue in leaders, a wise society encourages the development of moral virtue in those who will lead. In this regard, Thomas recovers against the modern world the notion that rulers must be morally prepared by education and the experience of life for the positions that they will have in adulthood. In point of fact, the wisdom to rule wisely is the most complete form of practical wisdom and its wise exercise the pinnacle of the life of practical reason (ST I-II, Q 50 First Article, 201).

Just War

One obvious principle of natural law with which most people agree is that violence and killing are wrong. Thus, war as a human activity is morally and practically suspect as an activity. As, Plato observed, “Every legislator will aim at the greatest good, and the greatest good is not victory in war, whether civil or external, but mutual peace and good-will, as in the body health is preferable to “the purgation of disease. He who makes war his object instead of peace, or who pursues war except for the sake of peace, is not a true statesman” [2]

Despite the universal hatred of war by right thinking humans, it is also a fact of human history and human life. Therefore, one obvious requirement for a wise ruler of practical wisdom is understanding the circumstances that might permit a war to be fought with justice.  War, if it is to be conducted at all, must be conducted with great practical wisdom and a degree of moral restraint. Otherwise, it is injustice on a vast scale.

Aquinas developed the theory of “just war” and gave it its classic form (ST I-II, Q 4, 165). For a war to be just, three conditions must be met:

1. The ruler must have the authority to declare war. There can be no private just war.
2. There must be a just cause for hostilities, that is to say that there must be some wrong that committed or threatened great enough to justify war. The wrong must be real and not just a pretext for going to war on other grounds.
3. Finally, there must be a rightful intention on the part of the one commencing hostilities to promote good or avoid evil. A war designed for gain, such as to control oil fields, would not be just.

This classic statement of the basic conditions for a just war has been much developed but still influences thinkers and actors in the area of war.

Conclusion

As mentioned last week, Aquinas is a most difficult writer for a modern reader who is not trained in philosophy to read. His work is vast and complex. It would take a good deal more time than I have devoted to his work to more than “scratch the surface” of his thought. This week, we have expanded on his thinking about natural law, bringing into the conversation both the nature of the kind of practical reason that a wise governor needs and the characteristic virtues that a leader requires. Finally, we looked briefly at the way in which Aquinas articulates just war theory.

Copyright 2020, G. Christopher Scruggs, All Rights Reserved.

[1] This is taken from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/#LifeWork (Downloaded November 9, 2020).

[2] Plato, Laws Tr. Jowett https://books.apple.com/us/book/laws/id501268153 (Downloaded November 12, 2012).